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1. Introduction 
(…) On the one hand, then, change that comes from within the system, as well as change that 
comes from without it, impinges on situations, induces short-time adaptations and produces 
short-time equilibria, which in many cases conform well to the picture drawn by the authors of 
the theory of monopolistic competition. On the other hand, new firms producing new 
commodities or old commodities by new methods will, as a rule, try to behave according to it, for 
that is the obvious method of exploiting to the full, and of keeping alive, the temporary 
advantages they enjoy. 
 Schumpeter (1964), p. 42 
Most existing models of the business cycle or growth either assume that there is a fixed 
range of industries and what happens over time is that new firms enter the existing industries 
– e.g. Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2005), Costa (2004), Portier (1995) - or the 
alternative approach that there is a fixed industrial structure (for example monopolistic) with 
the number of industries varying over time – e.g. Devereux et al. (1996), Heijdra (1998). 
On the empirical ground, there is plenty of evidence that entry and growth of observed 
total factor productivity are positively correlated – e.g. Aghion et al. (2004).  Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1999) suggest two possible links between both: i) endogenous desired 
mark-ups due to variable entry of new competitors in old industries and ii) increasing returns 
to product diversity due to variable entry of new industries. However, the usual zero-profit 
condition cannot be used to regulate both types of entry. 
What is new in this paper is that we allow for both types of change. Firms can either be 
set up in an existing industry or create an entirely new industry. Setting up a new industry has 
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a one-off sunk cost: this is set against the fact that the firm that undertakes this will enjoy a 
monopoly profit for a limited period. Joining an existing industry means that the firm does not 
incur a sunk cost, but has to share the market with the existing firms in that industry. Our 
approach allows for a two-dimensional industrial structure described by the number of 
industries and the number of firms per industry. The industrial structure of the economy 
represents the technology by which the economy transforms labour into output for 
consumption. There is no capital as such; the only state variables are the number of firms per 
industry and the number of industries. There is free entry which drives the profits down to 
zero in both dimensions: effectively, this also acts as an arbitrage condition equating the 
returns between entering and existing industry and setting up a new one. 
These two different ways that new firms can be set up behave differently. Once a new 
industry is set up, it is irreversible: the new technology or product it represents will always be 
available for free. This means that over time the number of industries can only grow, which 
creates a form of hysteresis in the economy. The entry of firms into an existing industry is 
reversible: firms can come and go over the business cycle. Furthermore, as the number of 
firms in the industry varies, so will the mark-up in the product market (we assume Cournot 
competition). If we look at the whole economy, the average mark-up is determined by two 
things: the number of firms in mature industries, and the number of new industries (the new 
industries are all monopolies for one period). The effect of technological shocks in this 
setting is to increase the mark-up. A permanent positive technological shock leads to an 
increase in new industries: since these are all monopolists for one period, the average mark-
up in the economy increases for one period following the technological shock. A negative 
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technological shock leads to a permanent increase in the mark-up: since the creation of a 
new industry is irreversible, the adverse change in technology leads to exit from existing 
industries and an increase in the mark-up. The same argument holds for demand shocks.  
Perhaps the most interesting result relates to a temporary positive shock: it can have a 
permanent adverse effect on efficiency. The mechanism is easy to understand. The 
temporary shock leads to an increase in the number of industries (even though it is 
temporary, it is worth the set-up costs to gain the temporary monopoly profit). When the 
shock dies away, this leads to exit from all industries (irreversibility again). Hence mark-ups 
increase and efficiency declines. 
In section 2, we describe the dominant market structure and the business creation and 
destruction process. On section 3, we build the macroeconomic model from its micro-
foundations. On section 4, we analyse the equilibrium existence, features, and model 
dynamics. Section 5 describes the business-cycles features generated by this model. Section 
6 concludes. 
2. Business creation and destruction 
Let us assume the production sector is constituted by nt (a very large number of) 
industries in period t and each industry j is composed by mjt firms. We also assume firms 
compete over quantities within the same industry and they compete over prices with other 
industries. This type of market structure corresponds to Cournotian Monopolistic 
Competition (CMC), according to d'Aspremont et al. (1997). If we consider all the firms 
and industries are identical, we have mjt = mt. 
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The usual way of endogenising the number of firms is to assume firms/industries are 
created or destroyed following profit opportunities, i.e. the well-known zero-profit condition 
regulates the number of firms. In a monopolistically competitive model with instantaneous 
free entry, mt equals one and the zero-profit condition determines nt.1 If the number of 
goods/industries is fixed (nt = n ), the free-entry condition controls mt, and induces a 
(counter-cyclical) endogenous desired mark-up model, using the classification in Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1999).2 
However, the arbitrage equation given by the zero-profit condition is not able to 
simultaneously determine both nt and mt. Furthermore, in the absence of additional costs, 
investors would always prefer to create a new industry where they can act as monopolists to 
entering a ‘mature’ industry where they would have to share market power. Thus, the 
monopolistic competition type of entry appears to be dominant in a frictionless world. 
Of course further investigation is needed in order to solve the entry indeterminacy. In real 
economies, profit opportunities are taken by producing a close substitute to an existing 
product or by creating a new one. The relative cost of these two forms of entry and its 
nature (flow and/or sunk costs) must be compared with the relative profitability of the 
alternatives in terms of expected discounted profits. Furthermore, the type of costs involved 
(R&D, marketing and advertising, etc. in the first case and intellectual property protection, 
royalties, etc. in the second), vary across time and space. 
Hence, we assume the number of industries at a given period is governed by: 
1. a sunk cost of creating a new industry that is fixed and represented by Wt; 
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2. a one-period protection for the creators of new industries, i.e. mkt = 1, when k is 
a new industry created in period t; 
3. the irreversibility of product innovation, i.e. nt ³ nt-1. 
In the first feature, we implicitly assume there are no costs of creating a perfect substitute 
to a mature product, but the costs of product innovation may be substantial. Of course, we 
can notice that if Wt = 0, we have the usual free-entry monopolistic competition (MC) 
model. However, if Wt is very large, we have a free-entry Cournot competition (CC) model 
in each industry. 
Without the second element (intellectual property protection or a simple time-to-learn 
effect), there would be no incentive to create new products, as new firms would immediately 
enter the new industry free-riding on the innovators expense. 
The last characteristic may look strange if we face it from a very micro-focused point of 
view: where are the Betamax VCRs or the stone-made tools, after all? We can find three 
counter-arguments for this remark: i) the technology to produce them is still available and 
these industries can be revived at any point in time, provided there is no civilisation 
catastrophe (e.g. the Dark Ages); ii) the home-video device industry or the mechanical tools 
industry are well alive and kicking; iii) from the macroeconomic point of view there is some 
evidence of an ever-increasing number of products3, but not of the total number of firms 
which appears to be pro-cyclical4. 
Therefore, a new industry k is created if the expected present value of profits exceeds 
the sunk cost associated with the new product: 
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where pks represents the operational profits of firm k in period s, 11(1 )
s
s qq t
id -
= +
= +P , for s 
³ t + 1, and d t = 1, is the appropriate discount factor, and is represents the interest rate. 
When investors expect future profit opportunities, the creation of new industries is only 
limited by i) the size of Wt and ii) the existing stock of viable ideas. On the latter, we assume 
this stock is very large and always increasing, so that it is not a binding constraint. In this 
case, considering the irreversibility assumed, the number of products existing in period t is 
given by 
 { }1max ,t t tn n N-=  , (2) 
where Nt represents the ‘optimal’ number of products in the period given the information 
available in period t and the value of Wt. 
Once this protection period is over, the absence of barriers to entry mean no pure profits 
can persist in any industry. 
3. The model 
We use a simplified intertemporal general equilibrium model to assess the importance of 
the assumptions made in the previous section in the macroeconomic equilibrium. Here, 
labour is assumed to be the only input, so we can insulate the dynamics of entry from capital 
accumulation. 
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3.1. Households 
Population is stable in this economy and there is a large number of identical households. 
Therefore, we can use a representative agent to study consumption and labour supply. This 
infinitely living representative household maximises the discounted value of its utility given by 
 
{ }
( )
1 1
,
1
max 1 . .
1 1t t
s s s
C L
s t
C L
b
q c
r
q c
- +¥
-
=
æ ö-
+ -ç ÷
- +è ø
å  , (3) 
where Ct is a consumption basket of the nt goods, Lt ³ 0 is the labour effort supply, r Î 
(0,1) stands for the discount rate, b > 0, and 1/q > 0 and 1/c > 0 represent the elasticities of 
marginal utility of consumption and in labour supply.  
The consumption basket is assumed to be CES: 
 
11 1
1
1
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æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
å  , (4) 
where cjt represents the consumption of variety j and s ³ 1 stands for the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties. The parameter l ³ 0 represents love for variety: l=0 
corresponds to 'no love,' and l = 1 corresponds to the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) assumption. 
ASSUMPTION 1: We suppose l < 1, i.e., the sharing effect is always stronger than 
the love-for-variety effect. 
In this case, and using duality theory in the usual two-step maximisation procedure, the 
appropriate cost-of-living index is given by 
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where pjt represents the price of variety j, so that 1. .
tn
t t jt jtj
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= S  . Thus, considering the 
aggregate consumption level as given, the demand function for good j is represented by 
 1.
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The budget constraint is given by: 
 . . .t t t t t t t tw L T n P Cp+ - = D W +  , (7) 
where wt is the wage rate, p t stands for non-wage income, and Tt represents a lump-sum 
tax. Since the economy is closed, there is no fixed capital accumulation, and it is not 
plausible to assume government would lend/borrow as much resources as households 
require, these agents are in fact liquidity constrained. The only way households can shift 
resources across time is by creating new industries, facing a sunk cost to obtain short-run 
abnormal profits. However, this is not a symmetric option as Wt is non-refundable, i.e. the 
option of liquidating industries (even if we allowed for reversibility of product innovation) 
adds nothing to the consumption possibility frontier. 
Thus, we can define net profit income as Pt = p t - Wt.Dnt (total operational profits of 
new industries minus the corresponding set-up costs), and the intertemporal decision 
becomes equivalent to a static problem in consumption and labour supply, where the only 
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dynamic decision is given by (1). The first-order conditions of the maximisation problem 
lead to the following behavioural functions 
 
.t t t t
t
t
w L T
C
P
+ P -
=  , (8) 
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c q
c
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where (8) stands for the consumption function and (9) represents the labour supply. 
3.2. Government 
We ignore positive externalities from government consumption in both household utility 
and production technologies. Government is assumed to have preferences similar to those of 
the household.5 Furthermore, since Ricardian equivalence holds in this model, not much is 
lost if we ignore government borrowing and impose a balanced-budget constraint in each 
period. Therefore, we have 
 1.
jt t
jt
t t
p G
g
P n
s
l
-
-
æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
 , (10) 
where 
1 1
11
1
.( )tnt t jtjG n g
sl s
ss s
- -
--
=
= S  represents the aggregate government consumption index, 
and gjt stands for consumption of good j; and also Pt.Gt = Tt . 
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3.3. Firms 
We assume firms are price takers in the labour market and compete strategically in 
product markets (inter-industrial price competition and intra-industrial quantity competition). 
Firm i in industry j maximises the present discounted value of its real profits 
 
{ },
max .
it it
s is
y L
s t
d
¥
=
På  , (11) 
where yit represents its output, Lit denotes its labour input, and profits are given by 
 . .it jt it t itp y w LP = -  . (12) 
Considering labour is the only input, the production technology is represented by 
 
( ) 1
1
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where At > 0 is the marginal product of labour, F > 0 stands for overhead labour and it 
generates a flow fixed cost (wt.F), Hjt is equal to 1 if industry j is being created in period t 
and 0 otherwise, and v ³ 0 represents the labour effort necessary to start a new industry, 
and it generates a sunk cost (Wt = wt.v). 
Taking the quantities produced by other producers in industry j (k ¹ i Î J) as given, the 
‘objective’ demand faced by firm i is represented by 
 
1
1 . .
it kt
k i J
jt t t
t
y y
p n P
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s
l
-
- ¹ Î
æ ö+
ç ÷= ç ÷ç ÷
è ø
å
 , (14) 
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where Dt = Ct+Gt represents aggregate demand. Since nt is large, firms are small at the 
economy level so that macroeconomic variables (Dt, Pt, nt, d t) are seen as exogenous by 
the firm. 
Considering there is no accumulation variable (e.g. capital stock) or lag structure, the 
maximisation problem is equivalent to static repeated game. If we ignore the multiple-
equilibria problem arising with the folk theorem, the solution, under an intra-industrial 
symmetric equilibrium, is given by the simple Cournot-Bertrand-Nash price-setting rule 
 ( ). 1 tjt jt
t
w
p
A
m- =  , (15) 
where mjt = 1/(s.mjt) represents the Lerner index in industry j. Notice the left-hand side of 
equation (15) gives us the marginal revenue and the right-hand side is the marginal cost for a 
representative firm in industry j. Here, profits can be expressed as a function of total 
revenues and total fixed costs in the period 
 ( ) ( ). . .it jt jt jt t jtp y w Hm vP = - F +  , (16) 
With the entry structure described in section 2, mark-up levels may differ between new 
(mN = 1/s) and old [mtO = 1/(s.mtO)] industries. 
3.4. Macroeconomic variables 
Let us define aggregate output as total value added, measure in terms of aggregate good 
units 
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1
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jt
t jt
j t
p
Y Y
P=
= å  , (17) 
where jt iti JY yÎ= S  stands for total output in industry j, and in equilibrium, we have Yt = Dt 
. Notice this structure is equivalent to an economy where households and government only 
consume a final good, produced in a competitive sector using Yjt as the only (intermediate) 
inputs, and with a production technology identical to (4). In that case, l would measure 
increasing returns to specialisation instead of love for variety.6 
We use the aggregate good as the numéraire in this economy, so that Pt = 1, for all t. 
Non-wage income is given by the sum of profits of all firms Pt = SiPit. 
Finally, if the labour market is in equilibrium, we have Lt = SiLit ³ 0, and wt automatically 
adjusts to reach it. 
4. Equilibrium and dynamics 
4.1. Steady-state equilibria 
First, we suppose at least a steady-state equilibrium for this economy exists, with the 
number of industries is given by n n> , where n  a number sufficiently large so that we can 
ignore feedback effects from the macro level. If we are in a steady-state and there are no 
shocks, there is no reason for new industries to be created, i.e. the profits of a new 
monopolist (pN) cannot be larger that the profits of a firm in a mature industry (pO). 
Therefore, all industries are of the ‘mature’ type, and firms within each industry are identical. 
Also, in the symmetric equilibrium, and given (5) firms post a price of /( 1) 1jp n
l s-= ³ . 
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In the absence of barriers to entry in each industry (and considering a stationary number 
of varieties), profits are pressed down to zero and equation (16) determines the equilibrium 
number of firms per industry (m), i.e. the equilibrium mark-up level m. Using equations (7), 
(9), (15), and (17), we may reduce the system to a pair of equations in C, n, and m: 
 ( ) ( )
1
1
1. . 1 . .C A n bC G
c
l c
qs cm
+
-
-
é ù
= - -ê ú
ë û
 , (18) 
 ( )
1
1
2
.
. . 1 .
.
A n
C n
b
c
l q q
s m
s m
-
-
é ù æ öF
= -ê ú ç ÷
è øë û
 , (19) 
where equation (18) is a reduced-form representation of product-market equilibrium and 
equation (19) corresponds to the zero-profit condition. 
Definition: A steady-state equilibrium for the model is a trio (C*, m*, n*) that solves 
the reduced-form system given by equations (18) and (19), such that it respects the 
feasibility conditions i) C* ³ 0, ii) 0 < m* £ 1/s, iii) *n n> > 0, and (iv) where there is 
no incentive to create new industries, i.e. pN* £ pO*.7 
In order to analyse the type of equilibria that correspond to the definition above, we first 
concentrate on the solutions to (18) and (19). We can reduce the two-equation system to a 
single equation in n and m, by substituting (19) in (18):   
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , , 0X n C n G Y nm m mº + - = . (20) 
Of course both n and m should be endogenously determined in the model. However, as 
noted in  Costa (2004), the same zero-profit condition cannot be used to obtain both values.  
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What we show is that the implicit function between m and n implied by (18) and (19) is 
strictly monotonic and increasing. We then show that the additional constraints in the 
equilibrium provide upper and lower bounds for m and n. 
First, let us define an equilibrium function which gives us the mark-up level which satisfies 
(18) and (19) for a given the number of industries n. For sake of simplicity we shall call it 
( ) ( ) 2, /F X nm m mº  and we can notice that any steady-state equilibrium can be 
expressed as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0F h qm m mº + =  ,8 (21) 
where  
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. 1 1
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q q
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æ öK = K K > = + > = >ç ÷
è ø
 . 
We can also notice that C = h(m)/m2 and Y = K2.(1 - m)/m 2.  
Proposition 1: For a given number of products, n, a solution m to (18) and (19) 
exists and it is unique. 
PROOF: See Appendix A. 
Second, let us generate an equilibrium function which gives us the number of industries 
which satisfies (18) and (19), for a given mark-up level ( ]0,1m m s= Î . Again, for sake of 
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simplicity we shall call it ( ) ( ),n X nmL º  and we can notice that any steady-state 
equilibrium can be expressed as 
 ( ) 0 2. . 0f gn n n GL º S - S + =  , (22) 
where 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
12 1
0 1
2 1 0
.
. 1 . 0 , . 1 . 0
. 1
. 0 , , 1 1
. 1 1
A
A b
b
f g
c q c
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c
s m
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l c s l
q s s
+ -
-
é ùæ ö
S = - > S = - >é ùê úç ÷ ë ûFê úè øë û
- -
S = S S > = = + >
- -
 .  
Notice both f and g are increasing in the level of love for variety. Furthermore, f is negative 
for l < c.(s - 1) and positive if l is larger than this value.9 
 Proposition 2: For a given mark-up level, m, a solution n exists which satisfies (18) 
and (19) and i) if q ³ 1 the solution is unique and ii) if q < 1 the solution is unique if 
and only if l < (c + q).(s - 1)/(1 - q) and a pair of solutions exists otherwise. 
PROOF: See Appendix A. 
For the rest of this paper, we make the following assumption which is sufficient (but not 
necessary) to ensure that l is small enough so that there is a unique solution under 
proposition 2: 
ASSUMPTION 2: We suppose l Î [0, min{1, c.(s - 1)}). 
Hence we put a limit to the love of variety to ensure a one-to-one relationship between µ 
and n.  
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Given the results of propositions 1 and 2 and assumption 2, we know that equation 
(20) implies a one-to-one strictly monotonic equilibrium relationship between n and m.  We 
now proceed to impose the constraints (ii)-(iv).  Now, consider the steady-state equilibrium 
pair (m*, n*) such that X(m*, n*) = 0. For m < c/(c + d), the region where m* has to be 
found, the function X(.) is increasing in m, as F’(.) > 0. Additionally, for l < c.(s - 1), X(.) 
is decreasing in n in the range where the equilibrium occurs, as L’(.) < 0. Thus, the left panel 
in Figure 1 represents the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria, corresponding to X(m, n) = 
0, as an increasing schedule in the (n, m) space, or alternatively a decreasing schedule in the 
(n, m) space. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
COROLLARY: Considering there is an increasing steady-state relationship between n 
and m, and that m £ 1/s, then there is a upper bound (nH) for the values n can assume 
in the steady-state equilibrium, such that X(1/s, nH) = 0.  
The corollary simply tells us that if the maximum mark-up (the monopoly mark-up) is s-1, 
this imposes an upper limit on the number of industries nH.  If there were more industries, 
then even with the monopoly mark-up they would lose money. 
Furthermore, in a steady state, profits of a firm in a new industry are given by 
( ) ( )11N* * * N * *. . . 1 .Y n A w wslp m s v-- é ùº - - F +ë û , whilst profits of a firm in a mature 
industry are given by ( ) 12 1O* * * * * * *. . . . . 1 .Y n A w wslp m s m -- é ùº - - Fë û . However, the 
equilibrium cannot be sustained unless there is no incentive for new industries to be created, 
i.e. if the additional cost of creating a new industry is sufficiently high, relative to the flow 
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fixed cost faced by all firms. Therefore, the last condition (iv)  imposed in the steady-state 
equilibrium values implies a lower bound on the number of industries: 
 ( )
1N
N* O* *
2 *2 *
1 1
1 . 1 0
1.
s
v m
p p f m
ms m
-
æ ö-
£ Û º ³ ¡ - º - ³ç ÷F -è ø
. (23) 
Proposition 3: For every positive value of the relative sunk cost there is a lower 
bound for the number of industries (nL) such that there is no incentive to create a new 
industry. 
PROOF: See Appendix A. 
This result implies that the relative size of the sunk cost determines a lower bound for the 
number of industries (nL). If f = v = 0,  the model collapses to the traditional 
monopolistically competitive solution: it is not possible for a mature industry with 
m0* < mN = 1/s  to subsist, as creating a new industry is always preferable to keeping this 
mark-up level. In this case ¡(1/s) = 1 and the number of industries has to be given by n* = 
nL = nH. 
If f > 0 there is a range of values for n* Î [nL, nH] that are compatible with more than 
one firm per industry, and this solution is sustainable, as the sunk cost is sufficiently high to 
preventing new industries from blossoming. See both panels of Figure 1 for a graphical 
determination of this range given f. 
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4.2. The initial steady state 
Let us assume the initial steady state, at time t = 0, is characterised by the following pair 
of values ( ) ( ] [ ]* *0 0, 0,1 ,L Hn n nm sÎ ´ . For sake of simplicity, we assume profits of creating 
a new industry are exactly zero in the initial steady state, i.e. the mark-up level is simply 
given by m0* = ¡-1(1 + f). In this case, the equilibrium number of industries corresponds to 
point L (nL) in Figure 1, i.e. it is the value of n0* that is a solution to X[¡-1(1 + f), n0*] = 0. 
This simplifying assumption allows us to determine the initial steady-state point of the 
system. However, as we will see in the next section, nt is determined by the dynamics of the 
system, i.e. it is path-dependent. This is a similar problem to determining the initial value of 
net foreign assets in an open-economy model. 
4.3. Entry 
Since we assumed barriers to entry in an existing industry disappear completely in the 
period after the industry creation, profits will be zero thereafter. Thus, the zero-profit 
condition for new industries also holds in the short-run10. Hence, substituting (14) and (15) 
in (16), we obtain the zero-profit number of varieties for each period: 
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Under assumption 2 this is unique. 
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Moreover, the effect of the sunk cost is asymmetric, since the economic rationale for 
destroying an existing industry cannot be the same for creating a new one. However, as we 
considered equation (2), the number of industries (nt) is only given by (24) when ut = 1. 
Figure 2 represents the equilibrium number of industries in period t given Qt º Yt.[(1 - 
mN).At]s - 1/(s.F.wts): 11 
[INSERT FIGURE 2  HERE] 
We adopt Q as a business cycle indicator. Assume the values of Q and n at the period t-
1 are represented by point A. For QB < Qt < QC, even ignoring the irreversibility in product 
innovation, there is no incentive for new industries to be created or destroyed, since the sunk 
cost introduces a discontinuity in the function representing the ‘optimal’ number of industries. 
For Qt < QB, the ‘optimal’ number of firms would be smaller than nt-1, but irreversibility 
prevents it. For Qt > QC, the sunk cost is not enough to detain product creation. Thus, Qt Î 
[0, QC) can be seen as a band of inertia. 
4.4. The aggregate production function 
Considering pure profits are zero at every moment in time (for two distinct reasons) and 
there is no investment, hence aggregate output has to be equal to labour income. 
Furthermore, we can use the aggregate output definition in (17) – or its CES reduced-form 
formulation in alternative – and substitute outputs using (14) and (15). If the product market 
is in equilibrium (Dt = Yt), we find the wage rate required by labour demand, and using it in 
the aggregate budget constraint we obtain a reduced-form aggregate production function 
given by 
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 Yt = At.Gt.Lt ,12 (25) 
where Gt is an efficiency index represented by 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
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We can notice its partial derivatives are given by 
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Note ¶Gt/¶nt is positive if and only if l > [Dnt + (1 - Rt).nt-1]/(nt + Dnt.Rt). If we evaluate 
the term on the right-hand side at the initial steady-state equilibrium we obtain l > 1 - R0* as 
an equivalent condition. Therefore, if there is no love for variety, this efficiency index is 
decreasing with nt, but it is non-decreasing with nt - 1. 
Let us analyse Gt with some particular cases: 
· In a Walrasian model all the firms face an infinitely elastic demand function, i.e. 
s ® ¥, and there can be no equilibrium with increasing returns to scale, i.e. 
22 LUÍS COSTA AND HUW DIXON 
 22 
F = v = 0 and l = 0. In this case both new- and mature-industries mark-ups 
are zero and Gt = 1, i.e. Yt = At.Lt . 
· If monopolistic competition always holds (v = 0) and there is no love for variety 
(l = 0), the mark-up is always fixed and equal to mN. Here, Gt = 1 - mN, i.e. the 
model works like a constrained Walrasian model. See Dixon and Lawler (1996) 
and Startz (1989), inter alia, for models in this class. 
· If the number of industries is fixed, entry leads to more intra-industry competition 
(f ® ¥), and if there is no taste for variety, all industries are mature and the 
mark-up is equal to mtO. In this case, Gt = 1 - mtO fluctuates in the opposite 
direction of the endogenous mark-up. See inter alia Costa (2004) and Portier 
(1995). 
· If monopolistic competition always holds, but there is love for variety (l > 0), we 
have Gt = ntl/(s - 1).(1 - mN), i.e. there are increasing returns due to entry. This is 
the case in Devereux et al. (1996) and Heijdra (1998), amongst others. 
4.5. Stability and dynamics 
To study stability in this model we log-linearise the dynamic system about its initial 
steady-state equilibrium, reduce it to a one-dimensional system in n, and compute the 
dynamic eigenvalue. 
Using (24) we obtain a log-linearised version for the ‘optimal’ number of industries: 
 ( )1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ. 1 . .
1t t t t
N Y A ws s
l
é ù= + - -ë û-
 , (26) 
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where *0ˆ /t tX dX Xº  represents the proportional deviation of variable X from its initial 
steady-state value. Notice the number of industries is pro-cyclical (relative to aggregate 
output) as we assumed that l < 1, and it would be counter-cyclical if we considered the 
possibility of having l > 1. The latter would happen because for l > 1 the love for variety 
effect would be so strong that it would offset the sharing effect and, as a consequence, 
profits would depend positively on the number of varieties. 
Equation (9) gives rise to 
 
1 ˆˆ ˆ. .t t tL w C
q
c c
= -  . (27) 
The equilibrium macroeconomic condition in product markets implies that 
 * *ˆ ˆˆ . (1 ).t t tY s C s G= + -  , (28) 
where s* º C0*/Y0* Î (0, 1] is the private-consumption share in aggregate demand in the 
initial steady state. 
Considering firms are free to enter or leave mature industries (provided at least one 
stays), the mark-up level in this type of industries evolves according to 
 ( )O *
1 ˆˆ ˆ. 1 .t t tQ nk
m lé ù= - - -ë û  , (29) 
where k t º [2/(1 + s) - mtO].(1 + s)/(1 - mtO) > 0, as mtO < 1/s < 2/(1 + s). Notice 
steady-state profits in mature industries react positively to changes in the mark-up level, as 
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¶PtO/¶mtO = k t.(wt + F)/mtO > 0. Furthermore, changes in the business-cycle index (Q) can 
be expressed as 
 ( )ˆ ˆˆ ˆ1 . .t t t tQ Y A ws s= + - -  . (30) 
Then, equation (25) gives rise to 
 ˆ ˆˆt t tY w L= +  , (31) 
with the following equilibrium real wage given by labour demand 
 ˆ ˆˆt t tw A= + G  , (32) 
and the consequent definition for the efficiency index 
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Finally, we log-linearise equation (2) and reduce the system to a single dynamic equation 
which can be used to analyse its stability: 
 ( ){ }1 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆmax . . . ,t t G t A t tn n G A ne h h- -= + +  , (34) 
where 
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We assume the time series for fiscal or productivity shocks are given by 
 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ. , . , , [0,1] , 1t G t t A t G AG G A A ta a a a+ += = Î " ³  . (35) 
If a temporary negative shock hits the economy (a decrease in Q14), the number of firms 
stays at its previous level, i.e. 1ˆ ˆt tn n -= . 
If a temporary positive shock hits the economy (an increase in Q), the number of firms 
changes, i.e. ˆtˆ tn N= .
15 Here, we can face four cases: 
· If e > 1, the dynamics of the number of industries is unstable and there is nothing 
that can prevent n of moving towards infinity after a positive shock in Q.16 
· If 0 £ e £ 1, the number of industries increases for a while, depending on the 
persistency of the shock, but it eventually stops at its new steady-state value. 
· Finally, if e < 0, the model would be unstable for e < -1 or it would produce 
fluctuations for -1 £ e < 0 if irreversibility did not prevent the number of new 
industries from decreasing. Thus, when a positive shock hits the economy we 
have an increase in the number of industries in period t = 1, and it stays at that 
level afterwards. Despite the fact n jumps to its new steady-state level, other 
variables (e.g. C, Y) display transitional dynamics. 
Thus, the stability features of the model depend solely on e. Unfortunately, it is a very 
complicated function of the fundamental parameters and it is not possible to obtain an 
unambiguous sign or range for values. There are three reasons for this ambiguity: 
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i) The effect of a wage increase on the ‘optimal’ number of industries is unknown 
and its sign is the opposite to the sign of a*. The direct effect of wages on Q is 
negative and so is its indirect effect when it increases consumption, decreasing 
employment. However, its income effect on output is positive. 
ii) The effect of the number of industries on wages (via efficiency index) depends on 
love for variety. 
iii) The absolute value of both previous effects combined is also important. 
Whilst e is bound to assume a range of values, we provide a numerical benchmark 
simulation below using the parameter set presented in Table I: 
[Insert Table I here] 
The values for q and c imply unit elasticities of marginal utility of consumption and labour 
supply, l = 0 eliminates increasing returns in n, n0 is a large number, A0 = 1 is a 
normalization, and the rest of the values chosen imply that m0* = 1/6, L0* = 1/3 and G0/Y0* = 
1/5. In this case we obtain e = -0.8, i.e. the model does not converge to the initial steady 
state after a temporary positive shock in Q. 
Moreover, in Appendix B we produce additional simulations that give us some 
illustrations for the values that e may generate for a range of values close to the benchmark 
set. We also found e £ 0.75 for the parameter sets considered. 
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5. Describing the Business Cycle 
5.1. The average mark-up 
First, if the path of the shocks (temporary or permanent) is known at t = 1 (the short 
run), then we know the path for nt. Second, using (29) and (34) we can observe that 
changes in the mark-up level of mature firms are given by 
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This equation can be interpreted as follow: if there is a positive shock in period t = 1 new 
products will be created (remember we assumed the profit of a new firm was exactly zero in 
the initial steady state) up to the number that erodes all the entry incentive. In this case, the 
mark-up level of mature firms remains unchanged, but the average mark-up in the economy 
increases in the short-run due to the entry of new monopolists.17 However, if the shock is 
negative irreversibility prevents the number of products from decreasing and the mark-up in 
mature industries increases. 
Thus, there is not a clear cyclical pattern for the average mark-up in the economy, since it 
is pro-cyclical for positive and counter-cyclical for negative shocks. In a real economy 
permanently hit by several shocks, the inertia band may be active for positive shocks, 
reinforcing counter-cyclicity, and the time-series for average mark-ups would show a 
moderately counter-cyclical pattern consistent with the findings in the empirical literature.18 
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5.2. A contractionary increase in productivity? 
Let us assume there is an increase in A in period t = 1 and government consumption 
stays at its steady-state level. Using equations (27), (28), (31), and (32), we can notice the 
immediate impact on aggregate output is given by 
 ( )1 1 11 ˆˆ ˆ.Y Acq c
+
= + G
+
 .  
If the efficiency index were constant, output would increase. This is what happens in fixed-
mark-up models. However, there is the clear possibility of a decrease in G following the 
productivity shock, when the number of firms goes up, i.e., when 1ˆ 0Q > . 
Proposition 4: Assuming q > 1 and l = 0, a productivity increase implies an output 
reduction if the set of parameter values generates an initial mark-up level in the 
following region: 
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PROOF: See Appendix A. 
Thus, for a small elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (q > 1) and ignoring 
increasing returns (l = 0), a productivity increase may decrease the average efficiency level 
in the economy and the aggregate output, provided the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties is not too large (it is necessary that s < 2). 
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At first glance, this result may look like a theoretical curiosity. However, Galí (1999) 
presents some evidence, for G7 countries, consistent with the contractionary technology 
shocks hypothesis, namely negative effects on hours and productivity in response to a 
positive technological shock. Of course this model is too simple to analyse what could 
happen in real economies, but a new transmission channel clearly emerges. 
5.3. The permanent effects of temporary shocks 
Now, let us assume the economy is hit by a positive shock (i.e. 1ˆ 0Q > ) in t = 1, but its 
persistency is given by 0 £ a i < 1, with i = A, G. This change can be due to either a positive 
fiscal shock or to a productivity shock. Notice the latter can be either positive or negative 
since it also affects the real wage that negatively affects Q. Also, let us ignore love for variety 
for a moment (l = 0). 
In this case, the number of industries increases in the short run. Due to irreversibility of 
product innovation, there is an excess of firms in old industries and a shortage in new ones, 
when the shock fades away. Given the positive relationship between mark-ups and the 
number of industries, depicted in right-hand panel of Figure 1, the new steady state will 
exhibit a higher mark-up level. This is a consequence of net business destruction in the long 
run. 
Here, a positive temporary shock has a permanent negative effect on the overall level of 
efficiency in the economy since it increases the average mark-up once and for all. If we 
allow for love for variety (l > 0), this negative effect may be partially or totally offset by 
increasing returns arising from growing varieties. 
30 LUÍS COSTA AND HUW DIXON 
 30 
To illustrate this claim, let us use the benchmark set to produce a numerical simulation 
and to compare the outcomes of the model with both a fixed-mark-up and reversible 
innovation model (f = 0), and a fixed number of industries model (f ® ¥). Notice we can 
choose the appropriate parameter values in order to generate the same initial steady state, 
namely using s’ = 1/m0* instead of s in the latter. For a one per cent positive shock in 
government consumption in t = 1 with aG = 0.85, we obtain the following impulse-response 
pictures: 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
The negative externality caused by the increase in the number of products when there is 
no love for variety depresses the efficiency index and thus output permanently. The effect on 
output is smaller than in the other two models even during the transition, especially due to the 
big increase in the average mark-up in the short run. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Allowing for a modest level of increasing returns in n (l = 0.1) reduces the negative 
impact of irreversibility, as expected. Figure 4 shows the effects of the same fiscal-policy 
experiment in four key variables.19 In this case, the efficiency effect of the positive shock is 
sufficiently high to produce a higher efficiency index in the long run, despite its under-
shooting and the permanent increase in the average mark-up. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have developed a dynamic general equilibrium model of imperfect 
competition where a sunk cost of creating a new product regulates the type of entry that 
dominates in the economy: new products or more competition in existing industries. We 
assume the process of product innovation is irreversible, which introduces hysteresis in the 
business cycle. 
The model exhibits some interesting Schumpeterian business-cycle features: i) the 
economy starts from a business-as-usual steady state where firms compete over existing 
products and abnormal profits are depressed to zero; ii) when significant profit opportunities 
are matched by product innovation, considerable market power is gained by the innovator, 
for a short period of time; and iii) when other firms are able to freely produce the new 
product, we have a new steady state that corresponds to a new ‘prosperity plateau.’ 
Here, permanent positive technology shocks can have a negative effect on the overall 
efficiency level of the economy that is absent in most models, as it leads to a permanent 
increase in the average mark-up, due to irreversible product innovation. Temporary shocks, 
either in technology or in demand, may also have permanent effects on the efficiency level, 
especially when the level of increasing returns in the number of products is small. 
Appendix A 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: First, notice F(0) = -K2 < 0. Furthermore, F’(m) = h’(m) + 
q’(m) and q’(m) = 2.G.m  + K2 > 0. Thus, we know that 
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Considering m = c/(c + d) Î (0, 1) is the only solution for h’(m) = 0,20 function h(.) is 
increasing for m Î [0, c/(c + d)]. Furthermore, F[c/(c + d)] = h[c/(c + d)] + G.[c/( c + d)]2 
+ K2.d/(c + d) > 0. Therefore, there is one equilibrium for the model in the interval m Î (0, 
c/(c + d)]. 
Since q[c/(c + d)] > 0, F(m) is always positive for m Î [c/(c + d), 1), no equilibrium can 
exist in this interval, despite the fact h’(.) < 0 here. Considering F(1) = G, m = 1 is a solution 
for (21) when there is no public consumption, but this is not an equilibrium. 
Thus, 0 < m0* < min{c/(c + d), 1/s}, such that F(m0*) = 0, is the unique equilibrium 
solution for the system, given n0.       g 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: First, if love for variety is not very high - i.e. if l < c.(s - 1) -
, f < 0. Therefore, L(0) is infinite for that range. Furthermore, L’(n) = f.S0.nf - 1-g.S2.ng - 1 is 
always negative in the interval considered, which means only one equilibrium can exist here. 
Considering ( )lim
n
n
®¥
L =-¥ , an equilibrium solution, n0*  > 0, exists. 
If l = c.(s - 1), i.e. f = 0, L(0) = S0 + G > 0, and considering the equilibrium function 
tends to minus infinity when n is infinite, we also have a unique equilibrium solution. 
For a large taste for variety, we may have 0 < f £ 1. In this case, L(0) = G ³ 0. 
Furthermore, notice that L’(0) ³ 0.21 We also have a unique solution for L’(n) = 0, given by 
nL = [g.S2/(f.S0)]1/(f - g) > 0 and L(n) tends to -¥ when n tends to infinity. Thus, a unique 
equilibrium exists: n0* > 0 such that L(n0*) = 0. 
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Considering now 1 < f < g, we have L’(0) = 0 (in fact, this is valid for all f > 1). 
Additionally, notice that L(nL) = (g - f).S0.nLf/g + G, and this value is larger than G in this 
interval. Therefore, L(nL) is still the maximum value for L(n) and this function still tends -¥ 
when n tends to infinity (for finite values of S2). Thus, a unique equilibrium exists in the 
interval: n0* Î (nL, +¥). 
For an even larger love for variety we may have f = g, i.e. l = (c + q).(s - 1)/(1 - q). 
Notice this can only happen for a large elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, i.e. for q 
< 1. Here, a unique equilibrium exists and it is given by n0* = [G/(S2 - S0)]1/g, provided that 
S2 > S0. 
Finally, we may have a very large taste for variety such that f > g, i.e. l > (c + q).(s - 
1)/(1 - q) (again, only possible with q < 1). In this case, L(nL) is a minimum of L(.) and we 
have ( )lim
n
n
®¥
L =+¥ . If G > (f - g).S0.nLf/g > 0, an equilibrium does not exist in this 
interval. For G = (f - g).S0.nLf/g, a unique equilibrium exists and it is given by n0* = nL. 
However, if G < (f - g).S0.nLf/g, L(nL) is negative and there is a pair of solutions to L(nL) 
= 0: one to the left of nL and another one on its right.  g 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Considering the no-incentive condition in (23), and the fact 
that ¡(m) is a decreasing function of the mark-up for m < 1/s < 2/(1 + s), we know that the 
steady-state mark-up has to be greater or equal than ¡-1(1 + f), and of course smaller or 
equal then 1/s. 
Thus, taking into account the trade-off between the equilibrium value for the mark-up and 
the steady-state number of industries represented by (20), we know that any m* Î [¡-1(1 + 
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f), 1/s], such that X(m*, n) = 0, is an equilibrium mark-up for a given n. However, the 
equilibrium condition imposes boundaries on the values that n may present in equilibrium, 
since it implies an implicit increasing relationship between n and m: 
· if n is larger than nH, such that X(1/s, nH) = 0 no steady-state equilibrium can 
exist without negative profits; 
· if n is smaller than nL, such that X[¡-1(1 + f), nL] = 0 no steady-state equilibrium 
can be sustained without industry creation. 
Therefore, nL is a lower boundary for n in equilibrium.    g 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: First, if we assume the number of industries increases 
( 1ˆ 0n > ), we are supposing the business-cycle index increases ( 1ˆ 0Q > ). Therefore, 
considering the ratio between the change in Y and Q is given by 
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we can observe this value is negative for q > 1 > s*. Thus, output and the business-cycle 
index go in opposite directions after a productivity shock. Now, Q is affected by 
productivity in the following way 
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where x = (q + s*.c).(1 - s.g1) + s*.(1 + c).g1. Thus, we observe an increase in Q following 
a productivity increase if x < 0. This condition is equivalent to s < (1 - z)/R0* + z, or to 
m0* < 1 - X(s, z). The function X(.) is strictly increasing in z, the function is increasing in s 
when its values are close to one, and it approaches unity when s tends to infinity. Also, it is 
not difficult to observe that, given z = z0, there is only one solution for X(s, z0) = 1, i.e. the 
value of s, and it is ( )0zs . Thus, this condition imposes a constraint on the range of 
possible values for s, and the maximum value that is compatible with m0* Î [0, 1) is given 
by ( )0 2s = . When z increases, ( )s ×  decreases and so the set of parameter values 
capable of generating a recession after a productivity increase is reduced, but it is not empty, 
as long as z is smaller than unity.       
    g 
Appendix B 
First of all, let us start with the parameter values in Table I. If we change the key 
parameter values one at the time or with another key parameter along a grid, we obtain the 
following values for e  
[Insert Table II here] 
We observed that e is non-monotonic in the values of several of the parameters, 
especially in q, s, and b. Variations in the values of l tend to be irrelevant for the 
eigenvalue. 
Finally, we ran a larger sequential grid-search numerical exercise to look for extreme 
values of e. The values for the parameters were in the following ranges: q Î [0.01, 20]; c Î 
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[0.01, 20]; l Î [0, min{1, c.(s - 1)}]; s Î [1.01, 30]; b Î [0.01, 100]; F Î [0.000001, 
0.0000001]; and G Î [0, 100]. The values obtained, realism aside, range from -151 to 
+5022. 
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1 See, inter alia, Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Heijdra (1998), or Startz (1989). 
2 See, inter alia, Chatterjee et al. (1993), Costa (2001), Portier (1995). 
3 Bils and Klenow (2001) report an implicit growth in variety growth of about one percent per year in the 
1959-1999 period, with a strong acceleration in the second half of the sample. 
4 On this subject see, amongst others, the literature reported in Chatterjee et al. (1993) for the U.S., or in 
Portier (1995) for both France and the U.S. 
5 The existence of love for variety in government preferences may be criticised. However, as Heijdra and 
van der Ploeg (1996) noticed, using different aggregators may influence the mark-up by changing the 
composition of aggregate demand. Galí (1994a) showed this additional source of endogenous mark-ups 
may introduce further complications in the model. Hence, we use this assumption for sake of simplicity. 
6 See Devereux et al. (1996) to see the consequences of changing nt in this alternative environment with 
mt = 1 (v = 0). 
7 Henceforth, asterisks stand for steady-state equilibrium values. 
8 Note that m = 0 cannot be a steady-state equilibrium with F > 0. 
9 Considering most empirical studies point to a small elasticity of intertemporal substitution in labour 
supply, we have c > 1. Moreover, for plausible values of s (e.g., for s  > 2), the level of love for variety 
implied in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) would not be high enough to generate f > 0. Notice f > 0 would mean 
the individual profit function was increasing in n. 
10 It would not hold if the protection period were longer. Alternatively, entry would also be sluggish if 
we consider an intertemporal arbitrage condition equating a cost of entry, considered to be an 
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increasing function of the entry flow, to the net present value of incumbency. For a monopolistic-
competition model in this class see Datta and Dixon (2002). 
11 Notice Nt = [Qt/(1 + f)]
1/(1 - l) . 
12 Notice that wt = At.Gt. 
13 Note ¡(mt
O) = Rt/(s.mt
O)2. 
14 Notice an increase in productivity (A) may have a negative effect on Q due to its positive impact in 
real wages. 
15 Assuming m0
* = ¡-1(1 + f), means the economy is, in t = 1, at point A = C in Figure 2 . Thus, there is no 
inertia band at the right of it. 
16 This source of instability may disappear in a model with capital accumulation or in an open-economy 
framework, as the transversality condition works by keeping the discounted utility finite. 
17 We can define the average mark-up as mA = 1 - nt
-l/(s - 1).Gt. 
18 See Martins and Scarpetta (2002), inter alia. 
19 Of course the steady states do not produce the same values. 
20 We also have m = 0 (perfect competition) as a solution in the interval. However, this cannot be an 
equilibrium since F > 0 implies increasing returns to scale at the firm level. Likewise, have m = 1 is also a 
solution, but it implies an infinite price or a zero marginal cost. 
21 The value of the derivative is zero for f > 1 and it is  S0 > 0 for f = 1. 
  
 
FIGURE 1 – BOUNDARIES TO MARK-UPS AND NUMBER OF INDUSTRIES 
 
FIGURE 2 – THE EQUILIBRIUM NUMBER OF INDUSTRIES 
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FIGURE 3 – A TEMPORARY FISCAL SHOCK 
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FIGURE 4 – INCREASING RETURNS IN THE NUMBER OF INDUSTRIES 
  
TABLE I 
NUMERICAL VALUES FOR THE PARAMETERS IN THE BENCHMARK MODEL 
θ χ λ A0 σ n0 b Φ G0 
1 1 0 1 2 1000 45/4 1/54000 1/18 
 
TABLE II 
NUMERICAL VALUES FOR THE EIGENVALUE 
Main parameter Range for ε Secondary parameter Range for ε 
θ ∈ [0.01, 100] [-8.270, -0.249] λ ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1} [-8.270, -0.016] 
χ ∈ [0.01, 100] [-0.986, -0.784] λ ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1} [-2.139, -0.768] 
σ ∈ [1.01, 100] [-1.253, 0.750] λ ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1} [-1.253, 0.750] 
λ ∈ [0, 0.3] [-0.831, -0.800] σ ∈ {1.01, 2, 10, 100} [-1.253, 0.750] 
b ∈ [0.01, 200] [-0.944, -0.789] λ ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1} [-0.952, -0.755] 
 
